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1. Epistemic skepticism about culpability 
Ignorance often excuses. Consider:  
 
Vera and the Vase: Vera opens one of the front doors of the small museum to get to her car. 
As she opens the door, it pushes a tall vase off balance. The vase, temporarily placed just 
outside that door by a cleaner, falls over and shatters as it hits the floor, rendered 
irreparable. 
 
Here are two ways of filling in the details of the case:  
 
Suspecting Vera: Walking towards the door, Vera was aware that a vase might be standing 
just outside—she saw a reflection of the vase in an open window next to the door—and 
knew that she should peek out to make sure or leave through the other door. Not wanting 
to take the extra time, however, she hoped for the best and opened the door. 
 
Unsuspecting Vera: Vera had no reason to suspect that anything bad would happen if she 
opened the door, and so no reason to be extraordinarily careful or to leave through 
another door.  
 
Suspecting Vera, it seems, can be blamed for taking the risk and destroying the vase. Not so 
for Unsuspecting Vera: she took her behavior to be unproblematic, and was justified in doing 
so. It could still make sense for her to feel bad about the outcome, and for the museum 
personnel to be upset. But the relevant emotional reactions are not those characteristic of 
moral blameworthiness—guilt and indignation—but instead something like what Bernard 
Williams (1976) calls “agent regret” and its second or third person counterparts. Similarly, 
Vera might have some (pro tanto or prima facie) duty to help amend the situation, if nothing else 
by notifying the museum personnel, but such duties can arise for outcomes for which one is 
not morally responsible or morally to blame.    
 Based on examples such as these, it is natural to conclude that when one acts based on the 
(implicit or explicit) belief that one’s action is justifiable and one cannot be blamed for that 
belief, one also cannot be blamed for one’s action. By the same token, it also seems plausible 
that if a belief has been formed based on the (implicit or explicit) assumption that the way in 
which it was formed was justifiable and one cannot be blamed for that assumption, one 
cannot be blamed for the belief. If so, it might seem that any blameworthiness will have to be 
grounded in acts (including acts of belief formation) going against one’s belief that what one is 
doing is unjustifiable—acts of akrasia. For illustration, consider another variation of Vera’s Vase: 
 
Wrongheaded Vera: Vera was aware that a vase might be standing outside the door but 
thought that she was entitled to risk damaging it. If the museum were placing fragile 
objects in such a way, it shouldn’t be her problem. 
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At first glance, Wrongheaded Vera seems blameworthy for her action: she acts on a self-
serving normative understanding of the situation, giving too little weight to the possible 
damage she might cause. But given the requirement that blameworthiness be grounded in acts 
of akrasia, and given that she took her action to be justifiable, her blameworthiness depends 
on whether she had previously taken what she then believed was an unjustifiable risk of 
reaching an erroneous moral conclusion. Moreover, acratic acts seem relatively rare, and 
akratic acts of unjustifiably reaching mistaken moral conclusions even more so. If nothing else, 
it can be very hard to know whether others’ wrongful behavior is ultimately the upshot of 
akrasia. Perhaps, then, we should be highly skeptical about most attributions of blame—or so 
a number of people have recently argued (see e.g. Zimmerman 1997; Rosen 2003; 2004; 
2008; Zimmerman 2008; Levy 2009; 2011, ch. 5; for criticism, see e.g. FitzPatrick 2008; 
Harman 2011). 
 While reflection on cases like Suspecting Vera and Unsuspecting Vera might seem to support 
this skeptical conclusion, other cases of unwitting wrongdoing suggest that blameworthiness is 
much more common. Consider: 
 
Scatterbrained Vera: Vera had seen the vase reflected in the open window next to the door 
and briefly noted how beautiful it was, but failed to integrate the information about its 
location into the spatial map guiding her action. 
 
Having failed to put two and two together, as it were, it might make sense for Vera not only to 
feel agent regret, but also to blame herself for what happened: “I should have realized”. The 
following paraphrase of an example from Randolph Clarke illustrates the same point: 
 
Forgotten Milk: You had promised your spouse to buy milk on the way home before the 
stores closed, but your thoughts drifted and you forgot. Your failure to remember was 
neither a case of akrasia nor the result of some blameworthy act, such as a failure to set the 
alarm on your phone, for you almost never forget things like these. Still, you can rightly be 
blamed for the lack of milk for breakfast (Clarke 2014).  
 
In light of this and similar cases, Clarke suggests that an agent can be responsible for ignorant 
wrongdoing when her lack of awareness “falls below a cognitive standard that applies to her 
given her cognitive and volitional abilities and the situation she is in” (Clarke 2014: 303).1 
 I agree with Clarke that blame can be appropriate in such cases, and exactly because the 
agent has fallen short of a cognitive standard. But contrary to what Clarke seems to assume, 
the appropriate sort of blame is not obviously moral blame. Rather, it seems to be a non-moral 
form of what we might call “skill blame”. Noticing and locating objects based on visual 
information, remembering things, or solving mathematical problems are activities that can be 
performed more or less skillfully, with greater or lesser excellence, and in all these areas we 
can be blamed or credited for resulting successes and failures. However, while you might kick 
yourself for failing to notice the location of an object or remember something, or for failing to 
                                                
1 Similar cases are discussed at some length by George Sher (2009). In a proposal that is structurally similar 
to Clarke’s, FitzPatrick (2008) suggests that blameworthiness can be grounded in the agent’s display of 
epistemic vices.  
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solve a mathematical puzzle, characteristically moral modes of blame involving guilt and 
indignation seem inappropriate. Moreover, they seem inappropriate even if the predictable 
outcome of your failure was horrific and morally highly significant: 
 
Fatal Failure: To disarm the ticking bomb in a densely populated building, you had to 
quickly solve a complex mathematical puzzle. Unfortunately, in spite of a highly focused 
effort, you failed to prevent the lethal outcome.  
 
Suppose that you had the capacity so solve the puzzle, and that your failure fell short of a 
cognitive standard that applied to you in the situation: you simply made a stupid mistake. 
Then agent regret for your involvement in the outcome and skill blame for your failure to 
solve the puzzle might both be appropriate, but you do not deserve moral blame for the tragic 
outcome. It wasn’t due to any moral shortcoming of yours. But similarly, if your failure to 
keep the promise to your spouse wasn’t due to any moral shortcoming, it is unclear why you 
would be morally to blame for it.2 
 I have suggested that the requirement that blameworthiness be grounded in some act of 
akrasia is untouched by the blame appropriate in cases like Forgotten Milk. I also believe that 
forms of epistemically based skepticism are deeply intuitively compelling. Moreover, these 
forms of skepticism seem independent of standard sources of responsibility skepticism, such as 
worries that putative objects of responsibility are the upshot of luck, or determined by factors 
outside of our control. 
 In this paper, however, I argue that radical epistemic responsibility skepticism is mistaken. 
In section 2, I sketch what I take to be the most promising general account of moral 
responsibility, blame and credit, building on the broadly Strawsonian idea that agents are 
morally blameworthy for objects that relate in the right way to a substandard quality of will, and 
the idea that responsibility is a certain kind of explanatory relation. In section 3, I explain how 
this account deals with central cases seemingly supporting the akrasia requirement, and how it 
avoids some objections to quality of will accounts recently raised by Gideon Rosen. But the 
intuitive worry brought out by these objections go beyond what is directly handled by a 
plausible quality of will account. In section 4, I spell out this remaining worry, argue that it 
shares a crucial structure with familiar skeptical or incompatibilist worries, and suggest that 
strategies for explaining away the intuitive pull of the latter are applicable in this case too.  
 
                                                
2 On quality of will accounts of blameworthiness such as that outlined below, you might be blameworthy 
for your failure to keep your promise if it is due to a failure to care appropriately about relevant matters. 
But Clarke’s example is designed to suggest that your shortcoming is merely cognitive. 
 My claim that you do not deserve moral blame in Forgotten Milk is partly stipulative. It might be 
appropriate for you to feel some (mild) agent regret for not keeping your promise (and for your spouse to be 
correspondingly (mildly) annoyed with you), and you might deserve non-moral skill blame for your memory 
lapse. You might also have a special obligation to mend the situation and to explain yourself. These or very 
similar features would be present if the forgetfulness had been due to a moral shortcoming on your part, 
and they are present because something morally bad happened: you did not keep your promise. In light of 
this, it is natural to say that you are morally to blame for the failure. However, such features can also be 
present in cases where you are clearly not morally culpable, such as that of Unsuspecting Vera.  
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2. The explanatory quality of will account of moral responsibility 
This section outlines what I take to be the most promising account of moral responsibility, 
blame, and credit—the Explanatory Quality of Will account (EQW)—and indicates how it yields 
unified explanations of a variety of familiar facts about moral responsibility. The presentation 
falls far short of a full defense, but I have motivated aspects of the account in detail elsewhere,3 
and elements that the account has in common with other quality of will accounts have 
received thorough defenses in the literature.4 
 The EQW builds on two main elements. The first is a general account of the sort of agent-
directed responsibility, blame, and credit that grounds criticism and praise in both moral and 
non-moral domains. Crediting or blaming someone, in the senses that concern us here, are 
modes of positive or negative evaluation that involve seeing the agent as responsible for some 
good or bad object, the object for which the agent is responsible and credited or blamed. The 
basic idea is that such evaluations are fitting if and only if the good or bad object of 
responsibility is the upshot of a corresponding shortcoming or excellence of the agent. A 
shortcoming here is some substandard aspect of the agent—some aspect falling short of what can 
be properly demanded of the agent—and an excellence is a corresponding superstandard aspect. 
For example, the student who arrives at the wrong answer to a mathematical question 
deserves math-related blame for this insofar as she made the error because she fell short of 
what could be properly demanded of her in terms of mathematical understanding, say, and 
the student correctly answering the question deserves math-related credit if solving it required 
her to surpass such demands. Similarly, a psychologist deserves professional blame for 
misdiagnosing a patient insofar as she did so because her skills or mind-set fell short of what 
can be properly demanded of her in her role, and a basketball player deserves basketball-
related credit for blocking a shot insofar as succeeding required surpassing what could be 
properly demanded of her in that role. 
 The amount of blame or credit given to someone typically depends at least partly on the 
value of the object of blame or credit. The player who makes the game-winning goal from a 
difficult angle gets more credit than the player who delivers a similarly difficult but less 
consequential pass, and a bumbling detective who sinks an investigation by destroying crucial 
evidence gets more blame than one whose equal amount of incompetence destroys evidence 
                                                
3 For an overview and more detailed application than can be offered here, see Björnsson Forthcoming-a; 
for some of my earlier discussion of this kind of account, see Björnsson 2011; Björnsson and Persson 2012; 
2013; Björnsson 2014a; b; Björnsson and Pereboom 2016. The current proposal is in many ways similar to 
Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder’s recent (2014) account of blame- and praiseworthiness of actions 
specifically, but covers blame and credit for omissions and non-agential events as well as for actions, and 
understands quality of will in relation to what can be properly demanded of agents in line with the general 
account of blame and credit.  
4 For the broadly Strawsonian idea that moral blame and credit depends on the agent’s concern with what 
is morally important, see especially Nomy Arpaly’s work (Arpaly 2003; 2006; Arpaly and Schroeder 2014; 
also see McKenna 2012). The idea that responsibility for an action is primarily a matter of how that action 
came about is familiar from John Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) and others working in the tradition of 
Harry Frankfurt’s (1969) “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”. 
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of less importance. (The value of an action might itself depend on the shortcoming or 
excellence involved in or displayed by that action. In sports, a move requiring high degrees of 
skill might itself seen as valuable and as an object of credit even if it does not in the end 
contribute to victory, and something is a bad act of recklessness only insofar as the act 
displayed a substandard lack of concern with certain risks.)5 
 Amounts of blame and credit also depend on how much of a shortcoming or an excellence 
was required to explain the outcome. The player who scored in circumstances requiring a 
high degree of excellence gets more credit for doing so than the player scoring in more 
favorable circumstances, and the student failing to answer the mathematical question gets 
more blame if the question was easier and failure required more of a shortcoming in 
mathematical ability. Notice that what matters here is not the agent’s degree of excellence or 
shortcoming, but only the degree required to explain the outcome. If the same degree of 
mathematical ability can be required of two students who have solved a certain mathematical 
problem, they get the same amount of credit for solving the problem even if one of them has a 
higher ability. 
 What can be properly demanded, and thus what counts as a shortcoming or excellence, 
presumably varies with context and with the capacity of the agent. Lower degrees of 
mathematical ability can be properly demanded of a novice or someone operating under a 
great deal of stress. In such cases, failure to correctly answer a given mathematical question 
might involve less of a shortcoming or none at all, and so yield lower levels of blame or none 
at all, and success in correctly answering the question might require a higher ability compared 
to what can be properly demanded, and so more credit, or credit where none would otherwise 
be due. 
 Shortcomings and excellences that ground blame and credit are negatively and positively 
valued at least in part because of their tendency to bring about correspondingly negatively 
and positively valued objects. Sport skills are valued because they contribute towards winning, 
mathematical abilities because they contribute towards mathematical understanding and 
problem solving, the skills of a detective because they contribute to the identification of 
culprits and gathering of evidence that holds up in court, a cool mind because it contributes to 
sensible action under pressure, wit because it contributes to relief and enjoyment, and so forth. 
(Low levels of skill or a skittish or dull mind are correspondingly negatively valued because 
they have the opposite tendency.) Importantly, such tendencies to bring about good or bad 
are relative to circumstances and involve characteristic ways of playing out. A “normal” way 
for an excellence to lead to something good or a shortcoming to lead to something bad is 
whatever way it typically leads to that sort of thing under the relevant circumstances.  
 This sort of normality matters for credit and blame. Suppose that a criminal seeking to 
create trouble for a competitor makes sure to tip off the best detective in the police force. 
                                                
5 Some will insist that the only thing that has positive or negative moral value is the expression of a morally 
super- or substandard state of mind, and that the amount of blame depends solely on that state and not on 
resulting outcomes. Though I think that this view is mistaken, often based on ultimately unfounded worries 
about outcome luck (see Björnsson and Persson 2012), it is strictly speaking compatible with the general 
account of blame and degrees of blame proposed here. 
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Suppose further that, as a result, that detective identifies the competitor as the perpetrator and 
collects the easily available evidence needed for a conviction. Here the detective’s high level of 
ability was a crucial part of why she solved the case—she would not have been tipped off 
without it. But her level of excellence did not explain the result in the normal way that it 
explains such outcomes, as she only had to use her basic skills. Consequently, she does not 
deserve credit for the outcome corresponding to the degree of excellence that was necessary 
for it. Similarly for blame: Suppose that the colleague of a bad detective actively sabotages an 
investigation where the bad detective is making good progress because the colleague thinks 
that such a bad detective doesn’t deserve success. Then the shortcomings of the bad detective 
were part of why the investigation failed, but not in the right way to attach the blame to her.6 
 Notably, tendencies for agential aspects to bring about good or bad can be general or more 
specific. A student might have a high general ability to solve a certain kind of mathematical 
problem, but suddenly find herself unable to do so. (We can think of strengths of tendencies as 
corresponding to proportions of circumstances within a certain set in which the agential 
aspect has the relevant outcome for normal reasons. The student might successfully execute in 
most of a broad set of circumstances, but have a low or zero rate of success within some small 
subset.) Correspondingly, demands on agential aspects might concern aspects with both 
general and specific tendencies. An agent might thus live up to the general demands but still 
fall short of demands pertaining to more specific circumstances.7 As a result, an overall good 
person might be to blame for failures that are “out of character”. 
 The proposal outlined here can be summarized as follows:  
 
EXPLANATORY BLAME (CREDIT): X deserves blame (credit) for Y if and only if Y is bad 
(good) and explained in a normal way by X’s corresponding aspect falling below (above) 
what could be properly demanded of X. 
 
DEGREE FROM DEVIATION: The degree of blame (credit) X deserves for Y depends on the 
value of the outcome and on how much of a deviation of the agential aspect from what 
can be properly demanded is required in the normal explanation of the object of blame 
(credit). 
 
                                                
6 In Fatal Failure, your mathematical shortcoming explained your failure to solve the puzzle in a normal way. 
But it might seem that it also explained the lethal outcome in a normal way: a failure of skill leading to a 
bad outcome that an application of the skill was meant to solve. Here it is important to remember that 
standards are set in relation to practices concerned with specific values. While you did fall short with respect 
to standards of mathematical skill relating to mathematical understanding and problem solving, Fatal Failure 
does not suggest that you fell short with respect to standards that are grounded in a general interest to 
achieve various practical outcomes or any specific interest to avoid disasters. (For this reason, the degree or 
math-related blame deserved is affected by the mathematical badness of not solving the puzzle, not by the 
badness of the fatal outcome. See DEGREE FROM DEVIATION.) 
7 Demands for aspects that tend to do good under specific circumstances might be in place exactly because 
it is natural to fall short in such circumstances even if one tends to do good generally, and procedures might 
be in place to help agents satisfy such demands, as when personnel practice dealing with emergency 
situations.  
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Above I said that blaming and crediting involves taking the subject to be responsible for the 
object of blame or credit. Given what has been said, the relevant notion of responsibility 
would thus be: 
 
EXPLANATORY RESPONSIBILITY: For X to be responsible for Y is for Y to fall in an 
evaluative dimension and be explained in normal ways by a corresponding aspect of X.  
 
Notice that on this account, responsibility (and blame or credit) does not require that the 
agent is responsible for the agential aspects that ground her responsibility.  
 These explanation-related accounts of responsibility and degrees of blame and credit 
provide the first part of the Explanatory Quality of Will account. The second part follows a 
tradition from P. F. Strawson’s (1962) “Freedom and Resentment” in identifying the agential 
aspect relevant for moral credit and blame specifically with the agent’s quality of will: this is the 
sort of agential aspect that grounds the sort of crediting and blaming that involves attitudes of 
moral gratitude, on the one hand, and guilt and indignation, on the other.8 Together with 
EXPLANATORY BLAME (CREDIT), the quality of will account yields: 
 
MORAL EXPLANATORY BLAME (CREDIT): X deserves moral blame (credit) for Y if and only 
if Y is morally bad (good) and explained in a normal way by X’s quality of will falling 
below (above) what could be properly morally demanded of X.9  
 
I take an agent’s quality of will to be a matter of how well she cares about what is morally 
important, where caring about something in the relevant sense involves being disposed to pay 
particular attention to information relevant for promoting or not obstructing the object of 
caring and to have one’s behavior be guided by such information. In the case of Fatal Failure, 
where you failed to prevent a deadly explosion because you made a mathematical mistake, 
you might deserve math-related blame if your mathematical savvy fell short of what could be 
properly demanded of you, but you would only be morally to blame for the outcome if it was 
the upshot of your failure to care appropriately. (In what follows, when I talk about blame and 
credit, I will mean moral blame and credit unless otherwise stated.) 
 In principle, the reliance on a notion of what degrees of caring can be properly demanded 
leaves room for a variety of conditions on responsibility discussed in the literature. One could 
                                                
8 In focusing on these agential aspects, I am not denying the importance of other aspects, and other 
evaluative reactions (see Shoemaker 2013).  
9 This falls short of a full account of deserved blame and credit in three ways: First, it says nothing about 
what counts as morally good or bad, thus qualifying as object of credit or blame. Candidates include, 
among others, wellbeing, harm, certain kinds of actions, certain relationships, and certain character traits or 
states of mind, all of which might be understood as agent-relative or agent-neutral values. Second, it says 
nothing about what it can be demanded that a given agent cares about, or to what extent. This is 
presumably closely connected to what counts as morally good or bad, but will also depend on such things as 
the agent’s capacity for caring about these things. Finally, I take there to be more than one kind of moral 
credit. One is captured by MORAL EXPLANATORY BLAME (CREDIT) and DEGREE FROM DEVIATION, but 
another, equally important, instead requires that the agent put some significant effort or sacrifice into doing 
moral good, even if that sacrifice was itself required rather than supererogatory (for examples, see Massoud 
2016). I set this issue to the side for reasons of space. 
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say, for example, that for a certain degree of caring to be properly demanded of an agent at a 
time, the agent must have had a certain kind of incompatibilist control over whether she 
would care to that degree at that time. I bracket such requirements, however, as those who 
take issues of ignorance to motivate responsibility skepticism typically take this motivation to 
be separate from what drives traditional incompatibilist skepticism or associated demands of 
ultimate control. What any account of responsibility, blame, and credit should be sensitive to, 
however, is the agent’s ability to grasp the relevant concepts and moral reasons, and perhaps 
also her ability to be motivated by morally relevant features. Moreover, since such abilities 
come in degrees, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the extent to which it can be morally 
demanded that someone care about certain features also comes in degrees. In sum, I will thus 
assume that:  
 
DEMAND FROM CAPACITY: The degree to which it can be properly demanded that X cares 
about something depends only on X’s capacity for so caring, not on how X came to care 
to the degree she does. 
 
I will understand X’s capacity for caring about something to a certain degree as a matter of 
how easy it would be for X to do so. I also take caring to some degree to be less easy the more 
X would have to be committed to so caring in order to achieve and uphold it given X’s 
relevant cognitive and motivational capacities and other relevant circumstances. 
 Together, EXPLANATORY MORAL BLAME (CREDIT) and DEGREE FROM DEVIATION 
straightforwardly account for central aspects of moral blame and credit (for more elaborate 
discussion, see Björnsson Forthcoming-a). Consider first the account of how partial but 
insufficient justification of a wrongful act lowers the degree of blame. Here, the explanation of 
a bad act (a lie, say, or an act of violence) will require less of a deviation in quality of will when 
there is some (though insufficient) justification than when all justification is absent. Second, 
consider how it accounts for the role of force, physical constraints, and threats as partial or full 
excuses or justifications. In typical cases of completely overwhelming physical force, there is 
no normal role for the agent’s quality of will in explaining the outcome. If resisting the 
physical force is possible, the resulting behavior might to some extent be explained in normal 
ways by the agent’s quality of will, but the higher the difficulty and cost, the less of a deviation 
in quality of will might be required to explain why the agent performed the action. Likewise 
for threats: they can provide the agent with strong valid reasons to perform the action and 
decrease the extent to which the explanation of the action requires that the agent’s quality of 
will fall short of what can properly be demanded of her. In the case of severe threats, even 
someone satisfying those demands would perform the action, rendering any ill will 
explanatorily superfluous and the agent blameless for that action.10 
 Finally, consider the account of why children might deserve less blame and more credit for 
a given kind of action than adults, and why someone who is blamelessly inebriated or 
exhausted might deserve less blame and more credit for a given act than someone in a normal 
psychological state. Given that children will often have less developed cognitive and emotional 
                                                
10 If performing the action with a bad motive is itself morally bad, the agent might still be to blame for that, 
even if she cannot be to blame for performing the action. 
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capacities than adults, the levels to which we can properly demand that they care about 
morally important matters are lower, meaning that certain good actions that are par for the 
course for an adult requires superstandard quality of will for a child. Similarly, the levels of 
general caring about morally important matters that we can properly demand of people might 
not be enough to guarantee that they behave well when inebriated or exhausted, and the 
levels of caring that can be properly demanded specifically for such situations might be lower 
exactly because inebriation lowers cognitive and emotional capacities. 
 
3. The Explanatory Quality of Will account and ignorant wrongdoing 
Consider next what EQW says about the excusing role of ignorance, beginning with 
variations of Vera and the Vase. Unsuspecting Vera had no reason to worry that opening the door 
would topple a vase, and thus seemed blameless for the outcome. This is easily explained 
given EXPLANATORY MORAL BLAME (CREDIT): the outcome is not explained by any deviation 
of her quality of will from what can properly be demanded of her. Suspecting Vera, by contrast, 
realized that opening the door posed an unjustifiable risk, but went ahead, hoping for the best. 
According to EXPLANATORY MORAL BLAME (CREDIT), this was blameworthy given the 
plausible assumption that her decision stemmed from a failure to care sufficiently about 
avoiding risks to others. Wrongheaded Vera thought that she was entitled to risk the museum 
property because they had put their property in danger’s way themselves. Again, 
EXPLANATORY MORAL BLAME (CREDIT) offers an intuitively appealing account of why she is to 
blame for destroying the vase: she willingly risked damaging museum property because she 
cared too little about the consequences of her own actions—too little compared to what could 
properly be demanded of her. The fact that she thought that she was justified in taking the risk 
does not in itself show that she cared about morally relevant matters as can be properly 
demanded of her. Scatterbrained Vera, finally, might be to blame for not realizing that there 
might be a vase just outside the door, but since this failure was plausibly due to a purely 
cognitive shortcoming and not due to substandard quality of will, she would not be morally to 
blame for the outcome. 
 In this regard, Scatterbrained Vera is different from other cases where agents fail to notice 
possible effects of what they are doing (Björnsson Forthcoming-a): 
 
Knockout: Leaving the room, Victor pushes the door open quickly and with great force, 
inadvertently knocking unconscious the person just about to open the door from the busy 
corridor outside. At the moment of action, it didn’t cross Victor’s mind that opening the 
door in that way might hurt someone, though he would have realized this if the question 
had come up. 
 
Badgering: Badgering his interlocutor with questions, Victor fails to pick up readily available 
signs of severe distress in her face and to adjust his behavior. His insensitive interrogation, 
happening at an unfortunate time, causes her great discomfort. 
 
Victor never considered the possibility that he might knock someone unconscious by opening 
the door, or cause great discomfort by his insistent questions. Still, most would be inclined to 
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assign at least some blame to Victor for the effects (though less than if he had brought these 
effects about knowingly). It is clear how EXPLANATORY MORAL BLAME (CREDIT) leaves room 
for these judgments: in both cases, the failure to access the relevant information, from 
memory and the visual field, respectively, might plausibly be explained by a failure to care as 
can be reasonably demanded of Victor, about risks he is imposing on others, and about their 
wellbeing. It similarly accounts for moral blameworthiness for forgotten promises when the 
forgetting is plausibly explained by a substandard quality of will (as in versions of Forgotten Milk 
where your forgetfulness is the upshot of a failure to care appropriately about your spouse, or 
about promise keeping). Finally, it is clear how DEGREE FROM DEVIATION accounts for the 
sense that Victor is considerably less blameworthy than he would have been if he had willfully 
ignored the risk of forcefully pushing a door open into a busy corridor, or willfully caused his 
interlocutor great discomfort. Doing such things requires more of a deviation in quality of will 
from what can be properly demanded. 
 In broad outline, these applications of a quality of will account of moral blameworthiness 
are familiar from the literature,11 and it is clear how they help the account avoid one kind of 
epistemically based skepticism about culpability, by foregoing the requirement that blame 
must be grounded in acts of akrasia. This is not to say that it is easy to determine whether 
someone deserves moral blame given EQW. What sorts of quality of will can properly be 
demanded of people is itself a difficult issue, and humans have a well-known tendency to over-
attribute actions to character traits rather than circumstantial factors. Moreover, whether an 
action or omission is explained by a certain quality of will of an agent typically depends on the 
agent’s beliefs and accessible information, both of which might be hard to ascertain, at least 
for an outsider. But compared to cases of akrasia, actions or omissions explained by 
substandard quality of will seem much more common, and less difficult to identify. 
 In foregoing the akrasia requirement on blameworthiness, EQW’s obviously runs contrary 
to arguments in support of that requirement. For example, Michael Zimmerman (1997; 2008, 
ch. 4) assumes that acts from moral ignorance are non-culpable if the ignorance is non-
culpable and argues that one is not in direct control of one’s moral ignorance, and so cannot 
be culpable for it unless it is the upshot of some wrongdoing over which one was in direct 
control. This wrongdoing would thus have to be an act of clear-eyed akrasia. Levy (2011, ch. 
5) argues (a) that, except in cases of clear-eyed akrasia, agents who do wrong do so in 
accordance with their internal reasons, and (b) that it cannot be demanded of agents that they 
act in ways incongruent with their internal reasons. 12  Against these arguments, the 
independent support available for EQW and the fact that it does a better job accounting for 
blameworthiness in cases like Knockout and Badgering provide independent reason to reject 
premises in these arguments. In response to Zimmerman, this gives us reason to say that 
agents in cases like Knockout and Badgering have the relevant kind of control over their 
ignorance in cases where it is the normal upshot of substandard caring. In response to Levy, it 
gives us reason to say that the moral demands that ground blame for non-akratic action are 
                                                
11 See e.g. Arpaly 2003: 160–62; A. M. Smith 2005; H. M. Smith 2011. 
12 Gideon Rosen (2003: 79–80; 2004: 306) sketches an argument very similar to Levy’s. For critical 
discussion of Levy’s version, see Robichaud 2014. 
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not demands that agents act contrary to their internal reasons, but that they care sufficiently 
about morally important matters (and so have different internal reasons). 
 It might be thought, though, that quality of will accounts like EQW run into problems 
with a family of cases provided by Gideon Rosen. In these cases, agents do bad things out of a 
lack of proper regard for others, but blameworthiness seems at least significantly mitigated by 
difficult epistemic circumstances that cannot themselves be blamed on the agents.13 Among 
the characters that Rosen asks us to consider is the Hittite lord who “buys and sells human 
beings, forces labour without compensation, and separates families to suit his purposes (Rosen 
2003: 64)”. The lord knows fully well that his actions degrades and harms the slaves and has 
no relevant false non-moral beliefs about the nature of the slaves that justifies the practice, but 
in his ancient Near East society no one has yet thought to object to slavery on moral grounds. 
Another character is the 1950s US father who supports the college education of his sons but 
not his daughters, unreflectively taking this to be obviously right because he was raised to do 
so, and because people he takes seriously take it to be obviously right: “an undefended axiom 
of moral common sense” (ibid.: 66–69; cf. Calhoun 1989). As Rosen points out, it would have 
taken an extraordinary feat of moral invention for these characters to see the wrongness of 
their ways given their cultural surroundings. For this reason, serious moral blame might seem 
out of place. The victims can rightly be upset with the actions and there is room for serious 
moral criticism, but when one takes into account the circumstances in which these agents 
found themselves for no fault of their own, it might seem deeply problematic to say that they 
deserve our indignation.14 And yet there is no doubt that these agents are acting from lack of 
proper regard for some of their fellow human beings.  
 I share Rosen’s intuitive sense that moral blame is significantly undermined in cases like 
these. But at least at first glance, there seem to be reasons to think that this is compatible with 
EQW. 
 The most obvious is that in order to behave like these characters do in a modern western social 
setting, one must not only care insufficiently about equal opportunity or the lives of the slaves, 
but do so in spite of being repeatedly prodded to reconsider and reevaluate. This, it seems, 
would require a considerably worse quality of will than what would be required in a context 
without social pressure to change one’s attitudes and behaviors, involving more of a 
determination not to take certain considerations into account. Though this falls short of 
showing that the Hittite lord or 1950s sexist father would be blameless given EQW, it does 
suggest that they would deserve less blame than their contemporary counterparts. Relatedly, 
as Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder (2014: 184) point out, others’ favorable attitudes 
towards a certain kind of action can cloud one’s understanding of what one is doing when 
performing it, making it harder for the Hittite lord to see clearly how his actions relate to such 
                                                
13 Rosen 2003: 72–73; 2008: 607–09. Cf. Fricker 2010; Mason 2015. 
14 Even if we are taken by Rosen’s argument, we might insist that certain kinds of morally grounded blame 
are appropriate, as long as they do not involve indignation (see e.g. Angela Smith’s (2013) understanding 
blame as a way of protesting—registering and challenging—a moral claim implicit in the blamee’s conduct), 
or think that angry reproach might be called for even when the targeted agents are not blameworthy 
(Calhoun 1989).  
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things as the slave’s humanity or potential for happiness, or for the 1950s sexist to see that he 
is not taking his daughters’ opportunities for flourishing seriously. If so, the shortcoming in 
quality of will required to explain their objectionable behavior might again be less 
pronounced than for their contemporary counterparts.  
 Another way in which EQW can accommodate intuitions about Rosen’s cases relies on 
the fact that, unlike some ways of grounding blameworthiness in the agent’s quality of will, 
EQW requires not only that the quality of will be bad. It also requires that the quality fall 
below what can be properly demanded, which in turn depends on the difficulty of caring, and 
so on the commitment needed to achieve and uphold various levels of caring. What matters 
here is that, typically, the commitment needed for achievement generally depends on external 
circumstances: the difficulty of achieveing a certain language proficiency, for example, 
depends on how much of the language one can access and what type of feedback is available. 
Similarly, how easily I can sustain a concern for various morally relevant aspects of my actions 
might depend on the extent to which such a concern is supported by circumstances: it matters 
whether others share and voice their support for such concerns, and it might matter what sorts 
of opportunities I have to act on such concerns and to make them part of my identity (cf. 
Vargas 2013, Ch. 7–8). The circumstances of the Hittite lord seem to fall short in just this 
regard. Exactly because there is no societal support for the abolition of slavery, caring enough 
about these things to give up one’s position as a slave owner would take extraordinary 
commitment or, in Rosen’s words, a moral genius. Perhaps something similar can be said 
about the 1950s sexist. Given this, and given the possibility that less bad a quality of will is 
required to explain bad action supported by wrongheaded social mores, EQW at least opens 
up the possibility of withholding full or perhaps all moral blame from these agents.15  
 (It is worth noting that even if the ability of the individual 1950s sexist to care about gender 
equality is diminished because of his social circumstances, it might not have been difficult for 
the group of 1950s sexists to care a lot more. After all, if they had been committed to care a lot 
more about this, they would have found social support for their caring. This might ground 
shared responsibility, and shared obligations to change the circumstances (see Björnsson 2011; 
2014a; Forthcoming-b).)   
 
4. Skeptical worries from explanatory innocence 
Together with existing independent support for the Explanatory Quality of Will account, the 
considerations adduced in the previous section begin to undermine the requirement that 
blameworthiness be grounded in clear-eyed akrasia. Assuming that traditional sources of 
skepticism can be rejected, EQW seems to give the right verdict in cases meant to motivate 
the akrasia requirement, without overgeneralizing from these cases and implying that most of 
our positive attributions of blame are mistaken.16 But I also believe that this and other quality 
                                                
15 Something similar can also be said about Kleinbart the Oblivious in Rosen 2008: 605–09. 
16 Even on these assumptions, it is quite possible that we frequently exaggerate blameworthiness by 
overestimating the amount of ill will required for a certain action. But the mistakes are likely less radical 
and pervasive than they would be given an absolute akrasia requirement. 
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of will-based responses to cases like Rosen’s fail to address a deeper worry that has lead a 
number of different people to independently make very similar arguments for epistemically 
based skepticism. More needs to be said to answer this worry. 
 Revisit the case of the 1950s sexist father. As Rosen tells his story, the father finds it 
obvious that men are entitled to better educational opportunities than women “because he 
was raised to find it obvious and because the people he takes seriously find it obvious”. 
Perhaps, given this background and this environment, it is difficult for him to care as much about 
opportunities for his daughters as for his sons, and difficult to see that he gives his children 
unequal regard. We can add further details to the case, however, that make this seem less 
plausible. Suppose that there were people in his town, just down the street, who were known 
to support higher education for women. But suppose further that the father failed to take their 
perspective seriously because their overall political views were starkly at odds with views he 
was raised to find obvious and that people he took seriously found obvious: they were taken to 
be “commies”, let us say.17 Finally, suppose that if he had been somewhat committed to 
caring about giving his daughters the same opportunities as his sons, he would have begun 
talking to these people exactly because of their views about this matter. Given the support he 
would have received from this group, caring about equal opportunities would not have been 
very hard. 
 If this is how we understand the case, it might have been only marginally harder for the 
father to care equally about his daughters’ and sons’ opportunities than it is for someone today. 
Moreover, even if the father’s judgment was in fact clouded by his social context, it would not 
have been clouded if he had cared enough about his daughters’ opportunities to seek out a 
more beneficial social context. Given this, it is unclear how EQW can avoid the conclusion 
that the sexist father is quite blameworthy. But focusing on how he was in fact raised, and on 
the people he was raised to take seriously, moral indignation can still seem quite misplaced. 
Sure, it would not have been difficult for him to achieve or uphold an appropriate level of 
caring about educational opportunities for his daughters given a commitment to do so. But to 
form such a commitment in the first place under those circumstances would still have taken 
extraordinary moral insight and independence, and it seems wrong to blame someone for 
something that only a moral genius would have avoided.   
 I take cases like these to pose a real challenge to EQW. Or, rather, they pose a real 
challenge given DEMAND FROM CAPACITY, i.e. given that the degree of caring that can be 
properly demanded depends only on the difficulty of caring given circumstances and relevant 
cognitive and motivational capacities. One way of defending EQW would thus be to simply 
give up DEMAND FROM CAPACITY and say that nothing like the degree of caring that can be 
demanded of a father today could be demanded of Rosen’s 1950s father, even if caring to that 
degree back then would have been quite feasible. On this interpretation, EQW would accommodate 
the sense that cultural context excuses. It would also likely have quite revisionary implications, 
                                                
17 In Rosen’s own version of the story, the father was aware that there were people taking a different view of 
the matter, but because of his background, even reflecting “honestly and with something like an open mind 
(2003: 67)” on these views, they would strike him as wrong-headed. 
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as many a mistaken moral view and lack of moral caring will have a history similar to sexist 
outlook of the 1950s father. 
 There is reason to reject this response to the challenge, however. The kind of epistemically 
based skepticism that it would accommodate, I will suggest, is ultimately grounded in the same 
sort of intuition as traditional forms of skepticism. It thus poses no independent skeptical 
challenge to the combination of EQW and DEMAND FROM CAPACITY. 
 What seems to undermine blameworthiness in Rosen’s cases is that the agent’s behavior, 
although reflecting a poor quality of will, is ultimately not his fault, or due to any moral 
shortcoming of his. The worry is not exactly the traditional skeptical one that his actions 
might ultimately be explained by factors lying outside of his control: prior causes, external 
conditions, or chance. For all we have said, his lack of equal concern was not determined by 
factors outside of his control, and his control might not have been undermined by any 
indeterminacy involved. But on reflection, the epistemic and traditional skeptical worries alike 
seem to be grounded in the following thought:  
 
EXPLANATORY INNOCENCE: The agent’s bad behavior is ultimately explained by factors 
that do not ground blame.  
 
Where traditional responsibility skeptics have stressed factors outside of the agent’s control, 
epistemically based skepticism also focuses on agential aspects over which the agent might 
perhaps have had control but that do not constitute shortcomings: strategies of acting on one’s 
internal reasons (Levy), or of assuming that one’s moral outlook and those of people one trusts 
are basically sound (Rosen).  
 If this diagnosis is correct, I will argue, we can account for intuitions supporting both 
traditional and epistemically based responsibility skepticism while denying that they are 
veridical. This way of explaining away skeptical intuitions, defended for traditional forms of 
skepticism elsewhere (Björnsson and Persson 2012; 2013; Björnsson 2014b; 2016), builds on 
the following: 
 
EXPLANATION EXPLANATION: Responsibility judgments involve explanatory judgments. 
Because of this, they vary with explanatory perspectives in ways characteristic for such 
judgments. Skeptical arguments induce non-standard explanatory perspectives that give 
rise to skeptical intuitions. 
 
In what follows, I will first indicate how the EXPLANATION EXPLANATION can account for the 
appeal of traditional responsibility skepticism and incompatibilism, before returning to the 
epistemically based variety. 
 The general idea that judgments of responsibility, blame, and credit involve a species of 
explanatory judgment is not very controversial. It is often acknowledged or stressed that if an 
agent is morally to blame for some event, it must have happened because of her, and we have 
seen how this can be seen as a general requirement on blame, whether moral or non-moral. 
More specifically, the assumption that responsibility judgments involve explanatory judgments 
can help explain the variety of excuses ordinarily acknowledged, and the role of partial 
justifications in mitigating blame (as sketched in section 2), along with otherwise puzzling 
 EXPLAINING AWAY EPISTEMIC SKEPTICISM 15 
GUNNAR.BJORNSSON@SU.SE   Draft for OSAR, ed. David Shoemaker 
attributions of shared responsibility (See e.g. Björnsson 2011; Björnsson and Persson 2012; 
Björnsson Forthcoming-a). The key idea here, though, is that in virtue of being explanatory 
judgments, responsibility judgments are affected by the same kind of contextual features as 
everyday explanatory judgments. 
 The kind of context-dependence that concerns us is well known, and can be said to have 
two interrelated features.18 First, ordinary explanatory judgments are strongly selective. If we 
are thinking about why some event E happened, we will focus only on one (or perhaps a few) 
events or conditions that were part of the causal prehistory of E, at the exclusion of 
innumerable others. If we are thinking about why a house burned down, for example, we 
might focus on the fact that the house was hit by lightning, rather than on the fact that the air 
contained oxygen, the fact that the house was built of combustible matter, or the fact that it 
lacked a first-class sprinkler system. Though we understand that these other factors were 
necessary conditions for E, we see them as part of the background against which something 
explains E rather than as what explains E, or its significant explanation. Our focus is typically on 
factors that deviate from what is generally expected, and so more informative than the factors 
relegated to the explanatory background. Moreover, we naturally focus on factors earlier in 
an explanatory chain, as long as they have a comparatively straightforward or familiar 
explanatory connection to E. Though we think that there was a series of intermediate events 
between the strike of lightning and the burning down of the house, such as the spread of fire in 
the attic just after the house was hit, we think of these exactly as intermediary events between 
what explanans and explanandum. Similarly, we acknowledge that the lightning that hit the 
house had a causal prehistory—the lightning was caused by a separation of charges in the 
neighboring atmosphere, say—but we focus on the lightning, as it has a more straightforward 
and familiar causal connection to the explanandum than have the events in its causal 
prehistory. 
 Schematically, our understanding of how multiple aspects of reality influence other aspects 
builds on a representation of how values of multiple variables are functionally related to values 
of other variables. In thinking that something explains something else, we (a) take 
explanandum and explanans as values of variables, (b) take the values of certain other 
variables as explanatory background, in effect treating them as constants, and (c) take the 
value of the explanandum variable to be a function of the value of the explanans variable 
given the values of the background variables, perhaps via some intermediary dependent 
variables. In doing so, we are ignoring various factors influencing the background constants as 
well as factors influencing the value of the explanans variable, treating it as an independent 
variable in our selective model of how the explanandum came to be. (See Figure 1.) 
 
                                                
18 My description of these in the next couple of paragraphs draws from Björnsson 2014b. 
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 The second feature of the context-dependence of explanatory judgments is that the 
selection of something as the explanans variable depends on our explanatory interests and 
salient representations of the influence between variables. Though you and I might ordinarily 
focus on the lightning when thinking about why the house burned down, a fire engineer might 
instead focus on the lack of a lightning rod, thus relegating the fact that the house was hit by 
lightning to the explanatory background. Similarly, a politician thinking about the same event 
might focus on inadequate funding for the fire department, and a physicist on specific 
properties of the building materials. Because of different explanatory interests, they might 
relegate different factors to the explanatory background and focus on different relations of 
influence involving different variables. And because of this, they will then naturally think of 
different things as the significant explanation of the outcome.19 
 The assumption that responsibility judgments are selective and context-dependent along 
the lines of other kinds of explanatory judgments can help us explain a variety of otherwise 
disparate-looking facts about such judgments, or so I have argued (see e.g. Björnsson and 
Persson 2012; 2013; Björnsson 2014b). What matters for our purposes is that it provides a 
unified explanation of skeptical intuitions about responsibility, intuitions elicited by 
deterministic scenarios, regress arguments, and arguments from luck. Put very generally, the 
sort of account that I have defended starts with the idea that since we attribute moral 
responsibility based on seeing the agent’s quality of will as the value of an independent 
variable, such attributions require the employment of certain kinds of folk-psychological 
explanatory models: call these “standard” models. What happens when we are confronted 
with descriptions of deterministic worlds or any of a wide family of skeptical arguments is that 
these trigger explanatory perspectives in which the agent’s quality of will figures as a mere 
intermediary dependent variable (like the fire spreading in the attic). The standard model is 
then no longer front and center, and the agent no longer seems responsible.20 
                                                
19 The aspects of selectivity and context-dependence mentioned here do not exhaustively account for our 
causal-explanatory judgments. For my own take on the basic structure of our causal-explanatory judgments, 
see Björnsson 2007. 
20 Based on intriguing empirical evidence, Eddy Nahmias and Dylan Murray (2014) have proposed an 
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 For example, regress arguments such as Galen Strawson’s “basic argument” or typical 
descriptions of determinism trigger a move from the standard model to an abstract model 
where the agent’s quality of will fails to stand out as particularly significant among the events 
causally preceding the putative object of responsibility, instead making some first cause such 
as the Big Bang or the abstract category prior causes the independent variable (Björnsson and 
Persson 2012: 336–41).21 Manipulation arguments work differently, instead triggering a move 
to a concrete model where one salient factor—the manipulation—straightforwardly explains 
the action by explaining the agent’s quality of will, thus rendering the latter a mere 
intermediate variable, undermining the sense that the agent is responsible.22 In either case, 
once one has been taken by these new explanatory perspectives, they have their own moral pull: 
exactly because an agent seen from this perspective seems non-culpable, the perspective will 
seem to reveal the inappropriateness of retributive emotions and actions. Consequently, 
changing focus back to the standard perspective and ignoring prior causes would seemingly 
ignore something of great moral importance. 
 This EXPLANATION EXPLANATION of forms of skepticism makes sense of variations in 
intuitions supporting traditional skeptical or incompatibilist worries, among philosophers and 
laymen alike (for data on the latter, see, among many others, Nahmias et al. 2007; Nichols 
and Knobe 2007). Unlike explanations of traditional skeptical worries in terms of 
incompatibilist conceptual requirements on responsibility, the EXPLANATION EXPLANATION 
can make straightforward sense of compatibilist intuitions too, in terms of judgments made 
from standard explanatory models. Indeed, given that standard models are central to social 
cognition and given that attributions of moral blame and credit play central roles in moral 
thinking and discourse, explanatory perspectives supporting such attributions will have their 
own attraction, counteracting that of non-standard skeptical perspectives. Given the 
EXPLANATION EXPLANATION, the attraction of both skeptical and non-skeptical perspectives is 
to be expected. 
 The suggestion now is that cases adduced in support of epistemically based skepticism 
work similarly to manipulation cases. The cases motivating either of these forms of skepticism 
focus our attention on factors that explain the action in question without invoking any 
                                                                                                                                                   
of determinism and its implications for agency. This suggestion, however, is undermined by newer studies 
(Rose and Nichols 2013; Björnsson 2014b).  
21 This, I have argued, is also why deterministic worlds do much less to undermine ascriptions of 
responsibility when people consider concrete acts of wrongdoing than when considering the abstract 
question of whether agents can be fully responsible in that world (Björnsson and Persson 2013; Björnsson 
2014b).  
22 Many arguments from luck or disappearing agency work differently still. By focusing on some relevant 
(random) element not part of the agent’s quality of will, they in effect relegate the latter to the explanatory 
background, much as the fire engineer’s explanatory interests did the lightning (see Björnsson and Persson 
2012: 341–44). 
 Chandra Sripada (2012) takes studies of his to suggest that people take manipulation to undermine 
responsibility because they take it to undermine certain compatibilist conditions. However, further studies 
undermine Sripada’s interpretation of the data and provide contrary evidence in line with the current 
proposal (Björnsson 2016). 
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substandard quality of will of the agent. In doing so, they prompt us to see his quality of will as, 
at best, a mere dependent variable. For example, in considering the behavior of Rosen’s sexist 
father in light of his upbringing and social surroundings, it is natural to see one or more non-
culpable factors (his normal capacities for moral reasoning, his upbringing, his social 
surroundings) as independent variables, while seeing his lack of concern for the opportunities 
of his daughters as a mere intermediary dependent variable. Insofar as we keep seeing the 
situation from this perspective rather than from a standard perspective, the father will not 
strike us as morally to blame. 
 The non-standard perspective introduced also has its own attraction. In manipulation 
cases, the manipulator that controls the agent’s action by controlling her quality of will stands 
out from what is ordinarily expected and makes salient a non-standard explanatory model in 
which the agent’s quality of will is seen as a mere dependent variable. In the case of the sexist 
father, the fact that his bad quality of will is the result of seemingly non-culpable epistemic 
strategies is itself remarkable and provides salience to the corresponding non-standard 
explanatory model. In either case, however, the sense that the morally ignorant agent’s 
responsibility is undermined can be resisted by resisting the accompanying explanatory 
perspective and stressing the involvement of the agent’s substandard quality of will (see e.g. 
Harman 2011; Wieland 2015). For example, if we focus on the fact that his daughters missed 
out on an education because their father cared more about the opportunities of his sons, 
without attending to the causal prehistory of his unequal caring, some degree of indignation 
on part of the daughters seems appropriate (cf. Rosen 2003: 73). 
 The EXPLANATION EXPLANATION of traditional and epistemically based skepticism does 
not in itself show that these forms of skepticism are mistaken. In fact, if the explanation is 
correct, it should ring true to those having skeptical intuitions. But if it is correct, this suggests 
that intuitions about cases cannot tell us whether to accept the skeptical conclusions until we 
know whether responsibility judgments are more reliable when made from standard or from 
non-standard perspectives (cf. Björnsson and Persson 2012: 345–48). In themselves, skeptical 
intuitions thus constitute no direct threat to the combination of EQW and DEMAND FROM 
CAPACITY. Moreover, assuming that we have reason to reject intuitions about responsibility 
stemming from non-standard explanatory perspectives, epistemically based skepticism 
motivated by cases like Rosen’s can be rejected along with more traditional, metaphysically 
based forms. And if we have independent reason to accept EQW and DEMAND FROM 
CAPACITY, the EXPLANATION EXPLANATION lets us explain away the intuitions seemingly 
supporting all these forms of skepticism. 
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